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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1569 
___________ 
 
ANRIFAT ABOUBAKAR; OMAR KADAFI, 
          Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
               Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency Nos. A088-168-240 & A088-168-241) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Rosalind K. Malloy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 10, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, VANASKIE and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 19, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Lead petitioner Anrifat Aboubakar and her husband, Omar Kadafi (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as “Petitioners”), petition for review of the Board of Immigration 
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Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order of removal issued in their consolidated removal 
proceedings.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition. 
I. 
 Petitioners are natives and citizens of the Union of the Comoros (“Comoros”), 
which is comprised of a group of islands located off the eastern coast of Africa.  
According to the U.S. State Department’s 2009 International Religious Freedom Report 
for Comoros, 99 percent of that country’s population is Sunni Muslim.  (A.R. at 443.) 
 In 2006, Petitioners entered the United States as nonimmigrant visitors.  They 
ultimately stayed beyond the time allowed under their respective visas, and applied for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”).  In support of their application, they claimed that they feared returning to 
Comoros because they had converted from Islam to Christianity during their time there. 
 In March 2010, an immigration judge (“IJ”) denied the application on the merits 
and ordered their removal to Comoros.  Petitioners appealed that decision to the BIA, 
which dismissed the appeal in February 2012.  In rejecting Petitioners’ asylum claim, the 
BIA agreed with the IJ that Petitioners had not demonstrated a well-founded fear of 
future persecution.  In support of this conclusion, the BIA stated as follows: 
Although one article in the record describes the detention of 
four Christian converts, there is insufficient evidence to 
conclude that these individuals were persecuted.  On the 
contrary, the United States Department of State’s 
International Religious Freedom Reports discuss societal 
discrimination, but not persecution, against non-Muslim 
citizens and converts to Christianity.  The Comoran 
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government prohibits non-Muslim citizens from 
proselytizing, but [Petitioners] have not engaged in this 
activity or expressed a desire to do so. 
 
 Turning to the individualized evidence, [Petitioners] 
submitted a letter from a member of their Comoran Christian 
group, who claims that members of the group are currently 
incarcerated.  They also provided letters from [Aboubakar’s] 
mother and sister, in which the writers assert that the 
authorities have inquired about [Aboubakar’s] whereabouts.  
The [IJ] reasonably afforded limited weight to these 
documents because they are unsworn, the writers were not 
subject to cross-examination, and the writers are interested 
witnesses.  The [IJ] further observed that the claims in the 
letters are not supported by the International Religious 
Freedom Reports.  Finally, [Petitioners] did not present 
corroborating evidence, such as a newspaper article, 
describing the detention of any members of their Comoran 
Christian group. 
 
 For these reasons, [Petitioners’] fear of persecution (as 
opposed to societal pressure and discrimination) is not 
objectively reasonable.  Moreover, they have not shown a 
pattern or practice of persecution of converts from Islam to 
Christianity. 
 
(Id. at 4 (citations omitted).)     
 Petitioners now seek review of the BIA’s decision.1 
II. 
 We begin by outlining the scope of our review.  As the Government correctly 
notes, Petitioners’ brief does not challenge the denial of their claims for withholding of 
removal or CAT relief.  Nor does their brief contest the agency’s conclusion that they 
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction over the instant petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 
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failed to establish past persecution.  Accordingly, none of those issues is before us.  See 
Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 
(3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that “[a]n issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening 
brief ”). 
 What is before us is the agency’s determination that Petitioners failed to 
demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution.  Because the agency’s conclusions 
regarding evidence of a well-founded fear of future persecution are findings of fact, we 
review them for substantial evidence.  Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Under this deferential standard of review, we must uphold those conclusions 
“unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  Abdille v. 
Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001).  Questions of law, meanwhile, “are 
reviewed de novo, subject to any applicable administrative law canons of deference.”  
Castro v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 671 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). 
III. 
 For an alien’s fear of future persecution to be well-founded, it “must be both 
subjectively and objectively reasonable.”  Dong v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 638 F.3d 223, 
228 (3d Cir. 2011).  “To establish objective reasonableness, petitioners must show that a 
reasonable person in the alien’s circumstances would fear persecution if returned to [the 
country in question].”  Chen v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 676 F.3d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “Persecution” includes “threats to life, 
confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to 
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life or freedom,” but “does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, 
unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Petitioners present three arguments in support of their challenge to the BIA’s 
future persecution analysis.  We consider them in turn. 
 Petitioners’ first argument is that the BIA misinterpreted certain evidence, and that 
it failed to consider two internet articles and the U.S. State Department’s 2007 Country 
Report for Comoros.
2
  We find this claim unpersuasive.  First, we find no error in the 
BIA’s interpretation of the evidence that it specifically discussed in its decision.  Second, 
we are not necessarily convinced that the BIA overlooked any evidence here.  As we 
have previously stated, the BIA need not “discuss every piece of evidence mentioned by 
an asylum applicant.”  Huang v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 620 F.3d 372, 388 (3d Cir. 2010).  
What is more, Petitioners have not established that the two internet articles and the 2007 
Country Report, when considered with the other record evidence, compel a result 
different from that reached by the BIA.
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2
 The Government contends that “Petitioners did not argue before the Board that 
the [IJ] failed to consider all of their evidence, and thus the claim is unexhausted.”  
(Gov’t’s Br. 22.)  Because it is plain from Petitioners’ brief that they are claiming that the 
BIA, not the IJ, failed to consider evidence, the Government’s exhaustion argument is 
meritless. 
3
 Although Petitioners note that one of those articles — a 2006 piece authored by 
“BosNewsLife News Center” — uses the term “persecution” to describe the treatment of 
Christians in Comoros, (see A.R. at 267), it is not clear what the author means by 
“persecution.”  What is more, it is not for the author of an internet news article to decide 
whether an alien has met the legal definition of persecution.   
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 Petitioners’ second argument is that the BIA failed to apply the three-part test set 
forth in Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001).
4
  As we have previously 
explained, the BIA must apply that test “when it determines that the production of 
corroborating evidence is necessary for an otherwise credible asylum applicant to meet 
his/her burden of proof.”  Vente v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis 
added).  It appears, however, that those circumstances were not present here.  Although 
the BIA did note that Petitioners had not presented evidence corroborating one of the 
letters submitted in support of their application, we do not read that brief portion of the 
BIA’s decision — a single sentence in a two-page decision — to mean that corroborating 
evidence was necessary for Petitioners to prevail.  Accordingly, there is no need to 
remand this matter for application of the three-part Abdulai test. 
 Petitioners’ final argument  is that the BIA erred in concluding that their fear of 
persecution was not objectively reasonable.  Having carefully considered the evidence 
submitted in support of their asylum application, we cannot conclude that this evidence 
compels a finding that Petitioners have an objectively reasonable fear of mistreatment 
that rises to the level of persecution.  Accordingly, we will not disturb the BIA’s decision. 
IV. 
 In light of the above, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                              
4
 We are not persuaded by the Government’s contention that this claim is 
unexhausted. 
 
